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The United States-Canada Free-Trade 
Agreement and the U.S. Constitution: 
Does Article III Allow Binational Panel 
Review of Antidumping and 
Countervailing Duty Determinations? 
INTRODUCTION 
The United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement! (FTA or 
Agreement) entered into force on January 1, 1989.2 The Agree-
ment is comprehensive and addresses many sources of friction in 
U.S.-Canadian economic relations. 3 The Agreement not only 
eliminates all tariffs between the two countries, but reduces many 
non-tariff barriers, liberalizes investment practices, and covers 
trade in services as well. 4 
In response to the particular Canadian concern that U.S. an-
tidumping (AD) and countervailing duty (CVD) laws5 are unfairly 
enforced against Canadian producers, chapter 19 of the Agree-
ment provides for binational panel review of AD and CVD de-
terminations, and obligates both parties to severely limit domestic 
judicial review of such determinations.6 The United States-Can-
ada Free-Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 19887 (Im-
I United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement, Jan. 2,1988, United States-Canada,_ 
U.S.T. _, T.I.A.S. No. _ at _, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 281 [hereinafter Free Trade 
Agreement or Agreement]. 
2 Memorandum on the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, 24 WEEKLY COMPo PRES. 
Doc. 1668-69 (jan. 2, 1989). 
3 See infra notes 64-87 and accompanying text. 
4 See generally Free Trade Agreement, supra note I. 
S Antidumping laws provide relief to American firms injured by foreign exporters who 
dump their goods in the United States. In general, dumping occurs when goods are sold 
in the U.S. market at a lower price than in the home market. J. BARTON & B. FISHER, 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT: REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 275 
(1986). Countervailing duty laws provide relief to American firms injured by foreign 
exporters who receive subsidies from their government. In general, subsidies take the 
form of cash payments or other government benefits which allow foreign exporters to 
lower their U.S. price below what it would otherwise be. Id. at 335-40. 
6 Free Trade Agreement, supra note I, at ch. 19. See also infra notes 76-96 and accom-
panying text. 
7 United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. 
237 
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plementation Act) brings the United States into compliance with 
this obligation. In short, the Implementation Act allows any party 
to an AD or CVD determination to request their government to 
initiate binational panel review of the domestic determination.8 
The Implementation Act further provides that if binational panel 
review is requested, then no United States court may exercise 
jurisdiction to review the determination.9 
Thus, the Implementation Act dramatically reroutes the ave-
nue of appeal for interested parties in antidumping and coun-
tervailing duty actions. Binational Panel Review raises several 
diverse constitutional considerations. 1o One such consideration is 
whether article III of the U.S. Constitution limits Congress's 
power to provide for binational panel review of AD and CVD 
determinations to the exclusion of U.S. courts. This Note focuses 
on article III implications for binational panel review in light of 
the traditional public rights doctrine and the Supreme Court's 
modern approach toward non-article III adjudication. 
Binational panel review satisfies significant and immediate Ca-
nadian concerns over application of U.S. trade laws. Such review 
also allows negotiations to continue over appropriate dumping 
and subsidy standards to govern the new free trade relationship.1J 
No. 100-449 §§ 401-10, 1988 u.s. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS (102 Stat.) 1851, 1878-
98 (1988) (amending scattered sections 19 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C.). 
8Id. § 401(c), 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(g)(8). The Agreement obligates the United States and 
Canada to initiate binational panel review upon receipt of a request. Free Trade Agree-
ment, supra note 1, at art. 1904, para. 5. 
9 United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 1988, supra note 
7, § 401(c), 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(g)(2). See infra notes 115-17 and accompanying text. 
10 First, does article III of the U.S. Constitution require review of final antidumping 
(AD) and countervailing duty (CVD) determinations by an article III court? If article III 
does not require article III review, may the President and Congress delegate such review 
power to a binational panel? May they do so by an international agreement? Do parties 
to administrative determinations have a substantive due process right to review by an 
article III court? Do they have a procedural due process right to article III court review? 
A final question is whether a binational panel, consisting of nonexecutive officers, may 
constitutionally make binding recommendations as the panel is empowered to do? See 
H.R. REP. No. 816, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 4 (1988). Several authors have recently 
addressed some or all of these issues. See generally Christenson and Gambrel, Constitution-
ality of Binational Panel Review in Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, 23 INT'L LAW. 401 
(1989); Note, The Constitutionality of Chapter Nineteen of the United States-Canada Free-Trade 
Agreement: Article III and the Minimum Scope of Judicial Review, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 897 
(1989); Note, The Binational Panel Mechanism for Reviewing United States-Canadian Antid-
umping and Countervailing Duty Determinations: A Constitutional Dilemma? 29 VA. J. INT'L 
LAW 681 (1989). 
11 See infra notes 76-87 and accompanying text. 
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Because binational panel review is central to the Agreement, its 
constitutionality is important to the Agreement's continuing vi-
tality.12 
The constitutionality of binational panel review also impacts on 
the ability of the United States to establish similar institutions that 
adjudicate trade claims or claims arising from entirely different 
policy areas. Canada is not the only foreign state experiencing 
problems with U.S. trade law. 13 It is possible that other states will 
seek similar arrangements with the United States. 14 Importantly, 
however, most negotiators of the Agreement do not view bina-
tional panel review as a model for similar arrangements between 
the United States and its trading partners. 15 Binational panel 
review presented a viable solution to U.S.-Canadian trading prob-
lems because of several factors unique to the U.S.-Canada rela-
tionship, such as common legal systems, a shared tradition of 
appellate review, similar standards for appellate review, similar 
AD and CVD law, and a common language. 16 The absence of a 
common legal heritage with Japan, Mexico, and most EEC coun-
tries would make similar arrangements with these countries much 
more difficultY Although short run prospects for similar ar-
rangements appear unlikely, it must be remembered that one 
hundred years ago a free trade regime between the United States 
and Canada seemed equally illusory.18 The conclusion of the 
United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement points out, how-
ever, that over time, increasing economic interdependence creates 
new demands and new opportunities for international integra-
tion. It is both timely and practical to consider the constitution-
ality of binational panel review because of its importance to the 
12 By pacifying Canadian concerns over U.S. antidumping and countervailing duty laws 
while negotiations over acceptable standards continue, exclusive binational panel review 
remains a cornerstone of the Agreement's acceptability in Canada. See supra notes 76-87 
and accompanying text. If article III is held to require review of AD and CVD determi-
nations by an article III court, then that cornerstone will crumble. In the short run, such 
a scenario would irritate the Canadian business community. In the long run, it might 
become a political liability for the Canadian Progressive Conservative Party and jeopardize 
the future of the Agreement, which is cancellable on six months notice. Free Trade 
Agreement, supra note I, at art. 2106. 
13 Colgan, Colloquy on ADR, 40 ME. L. REV. 225, 240 (1988). 
14 Telephone interview with Jeanne Anderson, Deputy General Counsel, International 
Trade Commission (Feb. 13, 1989). 
15 !d. 
I6Id. 
17 !d. 
18 See infra notes 25-27 and accompanying text. 
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Agreement and its implications for the future conduct of U.S. 
foreign policy. 
Part I of this Note explains the political history of the Agree-
ment. 19 Part II surveys the Agreement's economic objectives and 
central provisions.2o Part III considers the economic concerns that 
inspired binational panel review, and explains the general struc-
ture of such review. 21 Part IV discusses the impact of the Agree-
ment and its implementing legislation on U.S. antidumping and 
countervailing duty law.22 Part V examines the Court's traditional 
and modern tolerance of non-article III adjudication.23 Part VI 
considers whether binational panel review of AD and CVD de-
terminations is compatible with the Court's modern tolerance of 
non-article III adjudication.24 This Note concludes that under its 
modern analysis, the Court would find binational panel review 
permissible. 
I. POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE AGREEMENT 
A free trade regime between the United States and Canada has 
been a common goal of both Washington and Ottowa since the 
turn of the century.25 Though such close economic integration 
promises increased welfare for both parties, the issue has been 
particularly volatile in Canadian politics.26 By proposing to estab-
lish a free trade regime with the United States in 1911, the 
Canadian Liberal Party lost its parliamentary majority.27 The most 
recent effort by Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, lasting from 
1985 through 1987, sparked an acerbic and passionate national 
election, and nearly dashed his Progressive Conservative Party's 
chances to retain its majority in the House of Commons.28 
Prime Minister Mulroney formally requested that the United 
States and Canada explore the possibility of a comprehensive free 
19 See infra notes 25-63 and accompanying text. 
20 See infra notes 64-75 and accompanying text. 
21 See infra notes 76-101 and accompanying text. 
22 See infra notes 102-117 and accompanying text. 
23 See infra notes 118-216 and accompanying text. 
24 See infra notes 217-276 and accompanying text. 
25 janaco, Painful History Lessons, MACLEAN'S, Nov. 21, 1988, at FT4. The two nations 
have tried several times to conclude agreements reducing tariffs between them, only to 
be scuttled in the end by Canadian nationalist sentiments against a closer economic 
relationship with the United States. !d. . 
26Id. 
27 Id. at FT5. 
28 See infra notes 40-63 and accompanying text. 
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trade agreement on September 26, 1985.29 On December 10, 
President Reagan notified Congress that he would enter into 
negotiations with Canada toward this end. 3D U.S. and Canadian 
representatives began negotiations in Ottawa on June 17, 1986.31 
Eighteen months later, on December 9, 1987, they initialed the 
final text of the Agreement. 32 The Prime Minister and the Pres-
ident signed the Agreement on January 2,1988.33 
By its own terms, the Agreement could not enter into force 
until the United States and Canada each passed implementing 
legislation bringing domestic law into compliance with it.34 On 
July 26, 1988, Representatives Foley and Michel introduced H.R. 
5090, a Bill to Implement the United States-Canada Free-Trade 
Agreement, in the U.S. House of Representatives.35 On August 
9, after substantial committee review, the House passed the bill 
by a vote of 366 to 40.36 The House then referred the bill to the 
Senate, which passed it the next month by a vote of 83 to 9.37 
President Reagan signed the bill into law on September 28, 
1988.38 Though carefully considered by both houses of Congress, 
the Agreement and its implementing legislation met little oppo-
sition in the United States.39 
In contrast, an intense national debate over the FTA raged 
throughout Canada and culminated in the dissolution of Parlia-
ment and a national election. The Canadian government initially 
expected smooth passage of implementing legislation. Mulroney, 
whose government negotiated and concluded the Agreement, 
enjoyed strong support from his Progressive Conservative major-
29 United States-Canada Trade, 21 WEEKLY COMPo PRES. Doc. 1143 (Sept. 30,1985). 
30 United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement, 21 WEEKLY COMPo PRES. Doc. 1485 
(Dec. 15, 1985). 
31 Office of the United States Trade Representative, Summary of the U.S.-Canada Free-
Trade Agreement 2 (February 1988) (unpublished document available from the Office 
of the U.S. Trade Representative). 
32 [d. 
33 Statement on the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement, 24 WEEKLY COMPo PRES. Doc. 
4 (Jan. II, 1988). 
34 Free Trade Agreement, supra note I, at art. 2105. 
35 134 CONGo REC. H5887 (daily ed. July 26, 1988). 
36 !d.; 134 CONGo REC. H6665 (daily ed. Aug. 9, 1988). 
37 134 CONGo REC. SI2857 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1988). 
38 Remarks on signing the United States Canada Free-Trade Agreement Implementa-
tion Act of 1988, 24 WEEKLY COMPo PRES. Doc. 1217-18 (Sept. 28,1988). 
39 Canada Endorses Trade Accord with the United States, 46 CONGo Q. WEEKLY REP. 3631 
(Dec. 31, 1988). 
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ity in the House of Commons.40 Likewise, Mulroney counted on 
approval of the House of Commons' action by the Canadian 
Senate, for despite that body's domination by liberal appointees, 
it rarely challenges the Commons' measures.41 
Under pressure by his own Liberal Party to counter a recent 
surge in support for the Progressive Conservative Party,42 Liberal 
leader John Turner recognized that opposition to the Agreement 
would be a strong electoral base from which to challenge Mul-
roney.43 Faced with no prospect of challenging Mulroney's ma-
jority in Commons on the free trade issue, Turner announced 
on July 20, 1988 that the Liberal dominated Senate would delay 
its approval of FTA implementing legislation until the Prime 
Minister called a national election.44 
Because the Agreement specified January 1, 1989, as the dead-
line for each Party to pass implementing legislation,45 and because 
of certain political liability for not confronting the Liberal leader's 
challenge, Mulroney was forced to demonstrate popular support 
for the Agreement.46 On October 1, with his party leading the 
polls,47 the incumbent Prime Minister requested Governor Gen-
eral Jeanne Sauvee to dissolve Parliament and announced that a 
general election would be held on November 21.48 
40 Canada Bill Submitted, OPlC Measure OK'd, 46 CONGo Q. WEEKLY REP. 2093 (July 30, 
1988). 
41 Members of the Canadian Senate are appointed, and customarily defer to the elected 
House of Commons. [d. There is, however, some precedent for the Senate to block House 
bills. See Janigan, The Chamber With a Past, MACLEAN'S, Aug. 1, 1988, at 16. See generally 
Laver & Wallace,John Turner's Senate Gamble, MACLEAN'S, Aug. 1, 1988, at 10. 
42 Laver and Wallace, supra note 41 at 10. 
43 The Globe and Mail, July 22, 1988, at AI, col. 5. According to the Globe and Mail, a 
Canadian newspaper, one public opinion poll showed that voters who opposed the Agree-
ment felt stronger about the issue than those who supported it. The Globe and Mail, July 
22, 1988, at A2, col. 1. Moreover, 70 percent of voters sampled desired to vote on the 
Agreement before it became law. Laver & Wallace, supra note 41, at 12. 
44 The Globe and Mail, July 21, 1988 at AI, col. 2. Laying the cornerstone for his 
campaign, Turner proclaimed that, "This issue is so fundamental that the people of 
Canada deserve and must have the right to judge .... We're challenging the legitimacy 
of this Government to enact a fundamental change in the direction of Canada." [d. 
45 Free Trade Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 2105. 
46 Laver and Wallace, supra note 41, at 10. In effect, the liberal leader challenged the 
Prime Minister to put the Agreement before the electorate. If Mulroney had not risen to 
the challenge, and instead had attempted to postpone conclusion of the Agreement, he 
would have exposed himself to accusations of timidity. [d. 
47 The Globe and Mail, Oct. 3, 1988, at A7, col. 3. 
48 Janigan, The Call to Anns, MACLEAN'S, Oct. 10, 1988, at 10. The Prime Minister 
claimed Canadians would make their decision "based on the issues of leadership, economic 
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Despite the Prime Minister's attempt to run on the competence 
and record of his government, Turner successfully focused na-
tional attention on the impending intimate economic association 
with the United States.49 Warning of imminent economic and 
political domination, Turner stirred easily aroused Canadian 
nationalism 50 and seriously challenged the Conservative's lead.51 
As a matter of substance, Turner claimed that the Agreement 
left Canadian social, agricultural, and regional development pro-
grams vulnerable to attack as unfair trade subsidies.52 As a matter 
of nationalism, Turner claimed that the abandonment of eco-
nomic independence would result in mitigated Canadian sover-
eignty and diluted cultural integrity. 53 Turner's zealous appeal 
reached its zenith in a fiery televised debate with Mulroney, as 
he declared, "I happen to believe you've sold us out,"54 and 
accused Mulroney of turning Canada into a U.S. colony "[w]ith 
one signature of a pen."55 Mulroney responded weakly; four days 
later the Liberal Party surged ahead of the Progressive Conser-
vatives in the polls.56 Having struck a Canadian nerve, Turner 
kept up his attack on Mulroney'S patriotism, and portrayed him 
"acting as headwaiter at the White House."57 
Mulroney's Conservatives responded to this shift in momentum 
by unleashing a new strategy. Instead of focusing on the Agree-
ment's beneficial impact on Canada, Conservative leaders em-
phasized the potential costs of not ratifying the Agreement. They 
primarily warned of U.S. protectionism and a general loss of 
confidence in the Canadian investment environment by foreign 
investors. 58 The Prime Minister publicly emphasized that two 
million Canadian jobs were dependent on the FTA.59 
prosperity and the ability of the Conservative Party to manage the changes that face the 
country .... " The Globe and Mail, Oct. 3, 1988, at AI, col. 2. 
49 See janigan, A Critical Debate, MACLEAN'S, Oct. 24, 1988, at 12-14; Wallace & Tedesco, 
Straight to the Heart, MACLEAN'S, Nov. 14, 1988 at 12; N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1988 at A8, 
col.!. 
50 The Globe and Mail, Oct. 3, 1988, at A8, col. I. 
5IId. 
52 The Globe and Mail, Nov. 9, 1988, at AIO, col. 3. 
53 Id.; See also Drouin, Free Trade Bill May Force Canadian Elections, Wall St. J., Aug. 8, 
1988, at 17, col. 4. 
54 The Globe and Mail, Oct. 26, 1988, at A I, col. 2. 
55 Id. at A2, col. I. 
56 The Globe and Mail, Nov. I, 1988, at A I, col. 5. 
57 janigan, A Critical Debate, MACLEAN'S, Oct. 24, 1988, at 13-14. 
58Id. 
59 The Globe and Mail, Nov. 2, 1988, at AI, col. I. Editorials warned of impending 
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On election day, Mulroney's counter strategy proved trium-
phant, as Canadians returned a Progressive Conservative majority 
to the House of Commons.60 Canadian implementing legislation 
was reintroduced and passed by the House of Commons on De-
cember 24, 1988.61 The Senate, satisfied that Mulroney com-
manded a mandate to ratify the FT A, passed the legislation on 
December 30, 1988.62 With implementing legislation effective in 
both the United States and Canada, the Agreement entered into 
force by its own terms on January 1, 1989.63 
II. OBJECTIVES AND CENTRAL PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT 
The objectives of the FTA include: elimination of barriers to 
trade in goods and services between the parties, facilitation of 
conditions of fair competition, liberalization of investment con-
ditions, establishment of effective procedures for joint adminis-
tration of the Agreement and the resolution of disputes, and 
facilitation of further bilateral and multilateral cooperation to 
expand and enhance the benefits of the Agreement.64 To these 
ends, the FTA progressively eliminates customs duties on all 
goods originating in the territories of each party.65 National treat-
ment is to be accorded to all goods of the other party pursuant 
to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.66 The parties 
also agree to eliminate technical standards which are "unneces-
sary obstacles to trade,"67 and increase access to government pro-
American protectionism. The Globe and Mail, Nov. 1, 1988, at A6, col. 2. Front page 
news stories stressed the dependence of U.S.-Canadian relations on successful conclusion 
of the Agreement. The Globe and Mail, Nov. 9, 1988, at A6, col. 6. The Conservatives' 
tactics received a boost when, in apparent response to enhanced Liberal prospects, the 
value of the Canadian dollar dropped sharply. The Globe and Mail, Nov. 1, 1988, at Bl, 
col. 4. The fall of the dollar, the spectre of an irate U.S. Congress, and the prospect of a 
Liberal government inspired the Canadian business community to rally behind Mulroney. 
Some companies held information sessions for employees to underscore the Agreement's 
importance to their economic well-being. The Globe and Mail, Nov. 19, 1988, at AI, col. 
7. One business lobby, the Canadian Alliance for Trade and Job Opportunities, spent l.3 
million dollars on a four page defense of the Agreement in Canada's national newspapers. 
Id. at A2, col. 6. 
60 MacKenzie, After the Decision, MACLEAN'S, Dec. 12, 1988, at 16. 
61 See Canada Endorses Trade Accord with the United States, supra note 39, at 363l. 
621d. 
6! See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
64 Free Trade Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 102. 
6a Iii. at art. 40 l. 
66 Id. at art. 50l. 
67 !d. at art. 603. 
1990) FREE-TRADE AGREEMENT 245 
curement for each party_68 Specific attention is given to the con-
trolled reduction of barriers to trade in agriculture, wine, energy, 
and automotive goods.69 The Agreement notably provides for 
national treatment of service industries70 and for reduction of 
barriers to financial services as well. 71 
The Agreement also attempts to alleviate tensions over the 
application of V.S. antidumping and countervailing duty laws.72 
Toward this goal, chapter 19 of the Agreement provides for 
review of domestic AD and CVD determinations by panels com-
posed of Canadians and Americans.73 Chapter 19 also obligates 
each party to limit its court's appellate jurisdiction over AD and 
CVD determinations. 74 In effect, article 19 reroutes appellate 
review of AD and CVD determinations from domestic courts to 
binational panels. Though this scheme represents an innovative 
mechanism to resolve trade disputes, several questions arise re-
garding its compatibility with the V.S. Constitution. 75 An analysis 
of whether article III restricts Congress's power to provide for 
exclusive binational panel review of AD and CVD determinations, 
however, warrants an examination of V.S. and Canadian concerns 
which forged Chapter 19. 
III. BINATIONAL PANEL REVIEW 
The provisions of chapter 19 represent an innovative compro-
mise between two intractable positions. Throughout FTA nego-
tiations, secure and predictable access to the large V.S. market 
68 Id. at art. 130 I. 
69Id. at chs. 7-10. 
7°Id. at ch. 14. 
71 Id. at ch. 17. 
72 See infra notes 76-87 and accompanying text. 
73 Free Trade Agreement, supra note I, at ch. 19. 
74Id. at art. 1904, para. 15(g)(i). In sum, chapter 19 in part provides that through their 
respective governments, any interested party to a final AD or CVD determination may 
request review of that determination by a binational panel. If such a request is made, no 
domestic court may entertain an appeal from any of the parties. Any request for binational 
panel review must be made within thirty days of publication of the final determination. 
If a party to the determination desires domestic judicial review, the party may do so only 
after giving notice to all other interested parties ten days before the last day a panel may 
be requested and none of the parties subsequently request panel review. Id. at para. 
15(g)(ii). 
75 See H.R. REP. No. 816, supra note 10, at 4-5. The U.S. House of Representatives 
Judiciary Committee concluded that the panel and implementing legislation conforms 
with the Constitution. Id. 
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remained a central concern of the Canadian government.76 The 
Canadian business community perceived that relief available to 
U.S. producers under U.S. antidumping and countervailing duty 
laws posed a major obstacle to a stable economic environment.77 
Recent growth in trade law actions against Canadian exporters 
heightened this concern.78 Canadian business managers claimed 
that unpredictable application of AD and CVD laws significantly 
deterred them from exporting their goods to the United States. 79 
To avoid AD and CVD actions, Canadian firms selling in the U.S. 
market had to modify their pricing and marketing strategies.80 
The significant costs associated with defending against AD and 
CVD actions also affected their business decisions.81 Canadian 
negotiators contended that continuation of such a system would 
be incompatible with the goals of the FT A and proposed that the 
two parties clarify what type of subsidies82 would be appropriately 
actionable in the context of a free-trade relationship.83 
U.S. negotiators made it clear that substantive revision of U.S. 
AD and CVD laws would be impossible in the short run.84 They 
were, however, able to agree on a two part solution. First, chapter 
19 provides for continuing negotiation over appropriate AD and 
CVD laws to govern the new U.S.-Canadian trading relation-
ship.85 Until such an agreement is reached, chapter 19 establishes 
a procedure for binational panel review of each country's AD 
and CVD determinations.86 To facilitate use of binational panel 
review, chapter 19 obligates each party to limit its domestic courts' 
appellate jurisdiction to review AD and CVD determinations.87 
Providing for review of AD and CVD determinations by a panel 
which includes Canadian participation pacified Canadian con-
76 Hart, Trade Remedy Law and the Canada-United States Trade Negotiations, in UNITED 
STATES/CANADA FREE-TRADE AGREEMENT: THE ECONOMIC AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS 273 
(1988). 
77 Id. at 274. 
78 Rugman, A Canadian Perspective on U.S. Administered Protection and the Free Trade 
Agreement, 40 ME. L. REV. 305, 310 (1988). 
79 Hart, supra note 76, at 286. 
8°Id. 
81 Rugman, supra note 78, at 320-21. 
82 See supra notes 76-96 and accompanying text. 
8' Telephone interview with Jeanne Anderson, Former Deputy General Counsel, In-
ternational Trade Commission (Feb. 13, 1989). 
84Id. 
85 Free Trade Agreement, supra note I, at art. 1907. 
86 Id. at ch. 19. 
87Id. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
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cems about the application of U.S. trade laws. U.S. negotiators 
were able to give Canadian producers a window on the arcane 
world of U.S. trade law, while allowing the United States to retain 
its current AD and CVD laws and apply them in the first instance. 
A. Structure of Binational Panel Review 
Chapter 19 provides that, upon request of a party to the Agree-
ment,88 a binational panel shall be established to review final 
antidumping or countervailing duty determinations of a compe-
tent domestic investigating authority.89 A binational panel's task 
is to decide whether the determination was in accordance with 
the antidumping or countervailing duty law of the importing 
party.90 
Upon review, a binational panel may decide that the law of the 
importing country was applied correctly and uphold the final 
determination,91 at which point the dispute will be settled.92 A 
binational panel may also decide that the importing party's law 
was applied incorrectly, and remand the final determination for 
action "not inconsistent with the panel's decision."93 A decision 
of a panel to either uphold or remand a final determination is 
binding on the parties.94 
The Implementation Act ensures that the United States fulfills 
its obligations under the Agreement by providing that when a 
binational panel reviews an administrative determination and re-
mands it to the appropriate agency for action "not inconsistent 
with a decision of the panel or committee," the agency must take 
such action.95 Judicial review of any action taken pursuant to the 
binational panel's recommendation is specifically prohibited.96 
88 The Agreement obligates the United States and Canada to initiate binational panel 
review upon request of a person otherwise entitled to commence domestic judicial review 
of a final determination. Free Trade Agreement, supra note I, at art. 1904, para. 5. A 
party to the Agreement may also request limited review of final AD and CVD determi-
nations on its own initiative. Id. 
89 Free Trade Agreement, supra note I, at art. 1904. 
90Id. 
91Id. 
92Id. 
93Id. 
94Id. 
95 United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 1988, supra 
note 7, § 401, 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(g)(7). 
96 !d. 
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B. Composition of a Binational Panel 
When a party requests binational panel review of a final AD 
or CVD determination, the V nited States and Canada will select 
panelists.97 Each party is to develop a roster of twenty-five can-
didates and each will choose two panelists from their respective 
rosters.98 The parties then jointly determine a fifth panelist.99 
Candidates for a panel must be citizens of the V nited States or 
Canada and must be "of good character, high standing and re-
pute, and shall be chosen strictly on the basis of objectivity, reli-
ability, sound judgment, and general familiarity with interna-
tional trade law."lOo Further, no candidate is to be affiliated with 
either party or take instructions from either party.lOl 
IV. BINATIONAL PANEL REVIEW AND V.S. TRADE LAW 
A. U.S. Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Law: Before and 
After the Implementation Act 
The Tariff Act of 1930102 provides V.S. firms with a mechanism 
to attain relief from foreign dumping and subsidization. The 
Tariff Act of 1930 empowers the International Trade Adminis-
tration (ITA) and the International Trade Commission (ITC) to 
investigate instances of alleged dumping and subsidization, make 
final determinations, and grant relief. 103 Investigations into 
dumping or subsidies may be commenced by either the ITA or 
97 Free Trade Agreement, supra note 1, at annex 1901.2. 
98 [d. at annex 1901.2, para. 1-2. 
99 [d. at annex 1901.2, para. 3. 
100 [d. 
101 [d. Interestingly, judges are not considered as "affiliated with either party." [d. That 
judges are considered unbiased raises the question of whether substantive gains have 
been achieved in the creation of the binational panel. Presumably, unbiased judges will 
remain so regardless of whether they sit on a binational panel or in a domestic court. 
The answer might be that review by a binational panel consisting of members of both 
states has the appearance of greater integrity from the perspective of a foreign litigant. 
Thus, despite questionable substantive achievements, the mere form of the binational 
panel satisfies Canadian concerns, and therein seems to lie its political value to the 
Canadian government. 
102 Tariff Act of 1930, 46 Stat. 590 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 6, 19, 
22,31, and 46 U.S.C.). 
103 [d., 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671, 1673. Code reference to the "Commission" refers to the 
International Trade Commission. Code reference to the "Administering Authority" refers 
to the International Trade Administration. See [d., 19 U.S.C. § 1516a . 
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by an interested party who files a petition with the ITA on behalf 
of an industry.104 
In the case of subsidies, the ITA investigates whether a subsidy 
is paid with respect to the manufacture, production, or exporta-
tion of merchandise imported into the United States. 105 Simul-
taneously, the ITC investigates whether an established industry 
in the United States is materially injured or threatened with 
material injury, or whether the establishment of an industry in 
the United States is materially retarded by reason of imports of 
the subsidized merchandise. lo6 If both the ITA and the ITC make 
affirmative determinations, then the ITA must issue·a CVD order 
which imposes a duty on the imported merchandise equal to the 
amount of the net subsidy.107 
In the case of dumping, the ITA investigates whether foreign 
merchandise is sold in the United States at less than fair market 
value. lOB Simultaneously, the ITC investigates whether an estab-
lished industry in the United States is materially injured, or 
threatened with material injury, or whether the establishment of 
an industry is materially retarded. 109 If the ITA and ITC both 
make affirmative determinations, then the ITA must issue an 
antidumping duty order equal to the amount by which the for-
eign market value exceeds the U.S. price. 110 
Though neither the FTA nor the Implementation Act changes 
the standards for relief or the mode of investigation and review, III 
the Implementation Act dramatically changes the route for ju-
dicial review of final AD and CVD determinations. Prior to the 
Agreement all parties to AD and CVD proceedings could appeal 
to the United States Court of Internatio~al Trade (USCIT) con-
testing any factual findings or legal conclusions upon which a 
final determination was based. 112 Appeal of a USCIT decision 
was available in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 
104 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671a, 1673a. 
105 [d. § 1671(a)(1). 
106 [d. § 1671(a)(2). 
107 [d. §§ 1671d(c)(2), 1671e. 
108 [d. § 1673(1). 
109 [d. § 1673(2). 
110 [d. § 1673d(a). 
III See Free Trade Agreement, supra note 1, at ch. 19; United States-Canada Free-
Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 1988, supra note 7, § 401, 19 U.S.c. § 1516a. 
112 Tariff Act of 1930, supra note 102, 19 U.S.C. § 1516a. 
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and finally in the U.S. Supreme Court. 113 Thus, the prior legis-
lative scheme provided parties to final AD and CVD determina-
tions with opportunity for review by an article III federal court.114 
With limited exceptions, the Implementation Act significantly 
narrows the opportunity for article III court review. ll5 Under the 
Implementation Act, any party to an AD or CVD determination 
may request binational panel review. 1 16 If binational panel review 
is requested, U.S. courts lose jurisdiction to entertain appeals 
from the lower proceeding,117 and a binational panel will exercise 
exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the matter. Use of binational 
panel review is not mandatory, and if neither party requests such 
review, federal courts may still hear appeals of AD and CVD 
determinations. In light of Canadian concerns over bias in U.S. 
courts, however, it is unlikely that Canadian parties to AD and 
CVD actions will prefer U.S. courts to a binational panel. Thus, 
the implementing legislation in effect transfers appellate jurisdic-
tion over AD and CVD actions from article III courts to an 
international organization. It is this transfer that sparked article 
III concerns. 
V. ARTICLE III AND THE PUBLIC RIGHTS DOCTRINE 
Congress' modification of the appellate route for AD and CVD 
determinations involves two distinct actions. First, Congress se-
verely limited the appellate jurisdiction of all federal courts over 
AD and CVD determinations. Second, Congress provided for 
binational panel review and thereby created a judicial structure 
in which non-article III courts undertake both initial adjudication 
113 Communication from the President of the United States Transmitting the Final 
Legal Text of the U.S.·Canada Free·Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 1988, and 
a Statement of Administrative Action, Pursuant to 19 U .S.C. 2112(e)(2), 2212(a), H.R. 
Doc. No. 216, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 13, at 261 (1988). 
114 Dispute Settlement Provisions of the U.S.-Canada Free-Trade Agreement, 1988: 
Hearings on H.R. 5090 before the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 
100th Cong., 2d Sess. _ (1988) [hereinafter Senate Judiciary Committee Hear-
ings](prepared statement of Professor Andreas F. Lowenfeld, New York University). 
115 United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 1988, supra 
note 7, § 401, 19 U.S.C.A. § 1516a(g)(2)-(3). Jurisdiction is not withdrawn from U.S. 
courts in a case where no party to the final determination requests binational panel review. 
[d. Further, jurisdiction to review challenges to the constitutionality of the implementing 
legislation is granted to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit. [d. 
116 [d., 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(g)(8). 
117 [d., 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(g)(2). 
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and appellate review of AD and CVD actions. This Note under-
takes separate analyses of article III limits on each of these ac-
tions. 
A. Article III Limits on Congress' Power to Modify Federal Court 
jurisdiction 
Article III, section 1 of the U.S. Constitution provides that, 
"[t]he judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one 
Supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may 
from time to time ordain and establish."118 Though article III 
establishes the Supreme Court, it does not by itself establish in-
ferior federal courts.ll9 Rather, the text clearly leaves Congress 
discretion whether to create inferior federal courts at all. 120 
Section 2 of article III defines the 'Judicial Power" that is vested 
in the Supreme Court and the inferior courts. 121 The language 
of article III suggests that if Congress does indeed choose to 
establish inferior federal courts under section 1, then those courts 
will exercise the whole 'Judicial Power" as defined in section 2. 
As a matter of judicial doctrine and Congressional practice, this 
is not the case. 122 Instead, Congress enjoys significant power to 
modify federal court jurisdiction. 123 
The Supreme Court has consistently held,124 and it is generally 
accepted,125 that Congress is not constitutionally obligated to es-
tablish inferior federal courts. Rather, Congress enjoys complete 
discretion in prescribing inferior federal court jurisdiction, con-
stitutional issues notwithstanding. 126 In 1845, the Court boldly 
expressed its views on this congressional power: 
liB U.S. CaNST. art. III, § I. 
Ilg [d. 
120 Sager, Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdic-
tion of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17,23 (1981). 
121 "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this 
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, 
under their Authority .... " U.S. CaNST. art III. § 2. 
122 Sager, supra note 120, at 33. 
123 See infra notes 124-40 and accompanying text. 
124 See infra notes 127-28 and accompanying text; see also Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 
How.) 441, 448 (1850). 
125 A. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 35 (1983); Gunther, Congressional Power to 
Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. 
REV. 895, 912 (1984); Sager, supra note 120, at 33. 
126 Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) at 448. There is serious doubt that Congress may 
deny jurisdiction to review constitutional issues. See Sager, supra note 120. The Free Trade 
252 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XIII, No.1 
[T]he judicial power of the United States, although it has its 
origin in the Constitution, is (except in enumerated instances, 
applicable exclusively to this court) dependent for its distri-
bution and organization, and for the modes of its exercise, 
entirely upon the action of Congress, who possess the sole 
power of creating the tribunals (inferior to the Supreme 
Court) for the exercise of judicial power, and of investing 
them with jurisdiction either limited, concurrent, or exclu-
sive, and of witholding jurisdiction from them in the exact 
degrees and character which to Congress may seem proper 
for the public good. 127 
This passage anchors a "clear-and consistent-line of authority 
in the Supreme Court," and its principle is valid today.128 
Events at the Constitutional Convention and subsequent 
congressional practice explain judicial and academic acceptance 
of Congress' power. Professor Paul Bator, writing on Congress's 
power over federal court jurisdiction, explains that two pressure 
groups forged a compromise that resulted in giving Congress 
discretion to establish inferior federal courts. 129 One group be-
lieved the Constitution itself ought to establish inferior federal 
courts.130 The other believed that the Constitution ought to pro-
vide for no inferior federal courts at all. 131 This debate reflects 
the tension running throughout the convention between advo-
cates of a strong federal government and proponents of minimal 
federal powers. Professor Bator argues that instead of settling 
the issue as a matter of constitutional principle, the two groups 
agreed to leave it's resolution to the legislature's political judg-
ment. 132 Professor Sager, writing on this subject, agrees that the 
clear intent of the framers was "to compromise divergent views 
about the inferior federal judiciary by placing the matter in Con-
gress' hands."133 This "Madisonian compromise" was central to 
the Constitution's eventual approval by the convention. 134 
Agreement implementing legislation preserves article III court review of constitutional 
issues. United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 1988, supra 
note 7, § 401 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(g)(4). 
127 Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 235, 244 (1845). 
128 Bator, Congressional Power Over the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 27 VILL. L. REV. 
1030, 1032-33 (1982). 
129Id. at 1030. 
13°Id. 
IgiId. 
Ig2Id. at 1031. 
Igi Sager, supra note 120, at 33. 
194 Brown, Article III as a Fundamental Value-The Demise of Northern Pipeline and Its 
Implications for Congressional Power, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 55, 85 n.257 (1988). 
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Though the compromise left Congress full discretion whether 
to establish article III courts, the plain logic of article III led to 
the same conclusion in 1789 as it does today-that if Congress 
chooses to establish inferior federal courts, those courts will ex-
ercise the full judicial power and Congress may not modify their 
jurisdiction. 135 This same logic was argued in Congress before 
passage of the first judiciary act, and was rejected. 136 Instead, 
Congress firmly established its control over the jurisdiction of the 
federal judiciary. Congress interpreted its ultimate power to 
breathe life into inferior federal courts to include the lesser power 
of prescribing jurisdiction. 137 Subsequent congressional practice 
did not vary.138 Illustratively, lower courts did not acquire juris-
diction to hear federal law or constitutional questions until 
1875,139 and, "at no time in history has the entire judicial power 
been vested in the federal courts."140 Thus, the Madisonian com-
promise explains the Court's view that Congress's power to create 
federal courts and prescribe federal court jurisdiction is absolute. 
The Supreme Court has consistently held that Congress may 
modify the jurisdiction of federal courts it has created. l41 Scholars 
agree that Congress's power to modify federal court jurisdiction 
is consistent with the history of the Constitutional Convention 
and subsequent congressional practice. 142 In this light it appears 
that article III in no way limits the power of Congress to withdraw 
jurisdiction from federal courts to review final antidumping and 
countervailing duty determinations. Thus, in its withdrawal of 
such jurisdiction from federal courts, Congress acted consistently 
with its past practice as supported by constitutional doctrine. l43 
As Congress brought U.S. law into compliance with U.S. obli-
gations under the Free Trade Agreement, however, it did not 
just limit federal court appellate jurisdiction over AD and CVD 
cases. Rather, Congress also provided an alternate forum of re-
135 A. WRIGHT, supra note 125, at 4. 
136 Id. 
137 Bator, supra note 128, at 1031. 
138Id. at 1031-02. 
139 Id. at 1032; A. WRIGHT, supra note 125, at 4. 
140 A. WRIGHT, supra note 125, at 4. Professor Sager writes that, "[i]n the end, then, 
one returns to the rather clear fit between article III and the explicit act of compromise 
that was intended to let Congress determine the need for lower federal courts." Sager, 
supra note 120, at 36. 
141 See supra notes 118-40 and accompanying text. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. 
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view. 144 By providing for binational panel review, Congress fun-
damentally altered the institutional structure of AD and CVD 
adjudication. Now, administrative agencies perform initial AD 
and CVD adjudication, and, if requested by a party to the dispute, 
an international organization will review the agencies' decision. 
Under this scheme, there may be no article III court participation 
at any point. The remaining question is whether article III limits 
Congress' power to create this new scheme of non-article III 
adjudication and review. 
B. Non-Article III Adjudication and Review: The Traditional Public 
Rights Doctrine and the Modern Approach 
1. Textual Analysis of Article III 
Article III vests the judicial power of the United States in the 
constitutionally established Supreme Court and the congression-
ally created inferior courts. 145 Article III also requires that judges 
serving on article III courts receive irreducible salaries and hold 
their tenure for life. 146 Behind article III lies the specific intent 
of the framers to create a judiciary separate from the political 
pressure of the executive and legislative branches 147 that would 
exercise the federal judicial power. 148 Thus, article III seems to 
command that whenever the federal government exercises judi-
cial power, it must do so in article III courts, composed of inde-
pendent article III judges. 149 
Judicial doctrine and congressional practice indicate that Con-
gress is not limited by a strict interpretation of article III.150 
Rather, several Supreme Court decisions firmly establish Con-
gress's power to create non-article III courts that adjudicate 
claims, even if such claims fall squarely within constitutionally 
defined judicial power. 151 The Court has traditionally recognized 
144 See supra notes 102-17 and accompanying text. 
145 See supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
146 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
147 Northern Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50, 58 (1982). 
148 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
149 Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 57-60. 
150Id. at 916-17. 
151 Redish, Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and the Northern Pipeline Decision, 
1983 DUKE L.J. 197, 198. The Supreme Court has consistently recognized Congress' 
power to establish courts with judges who have neither salary nor tenure protections as 
mandated by article III. These courts are referred to as legislative courts, or article I 
courts. Id. The Court has also recognized Congress' power to provide for non·article III 
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this power under the rationale of the "public rights doctrine_"152 
Recent Court decisions expand the scope of permissible non-
article III adjudication beyond that allowed by the traditional 
public rights doctrine. 153 In doing so, the Court attempts to escape 
the confines of the traditional public rights analysis and invoke 
new considerations in determining permissibility of non-article 
III adjudication. 154 
For several reasons, article III does not prohibit binational 
panel review. First, binational panel review of claims arising un-
der AD and CVD laws responds well to the courts modern in-
quiries, and satisfy the Court's concern that the integrity of the 
article III judiciary remain intact. Second, to the extent that any 
new requirements are inferred from the Court's new approach, 
such as article III court review,155 these requirements do not seem 
applicable to purely public rights such as those arising from AD 
and CVD laws. As the Court developed its modern approach, it 
never expressed an intent to place new article III constraints on 
claims long considered susceptible to non-article III adjudication 
under a traditional public rights analysis. In short, AD and CVD 
adjudication and review require no more article III court partic-
ipation than provided for by the Agreement's implementing leg-
islation. Analysis of the traditional public rights doctrine and the 
Court's modern approach toward non-article III adjudication 
bears this out. 
2. The Traditional Public Rights Doctrine 
The historical core of the public rights exception to article III 
adjudication consists of instances where the government is a party 
to the suit. 156 Central to the doctrine is the principle that the 
federal government may chose to lift its veil of sovereignty and 
expose itself to suit on its own terms. 157 The Court established 
adjudication in military and territorial courts. See American Insurance Co. v. Canter, 26 
U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 546 (1828); Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 402-03 (1973). 
152 Young, Public Rights and the Federal Judicial Power: From Murray's Lessee Through Crowell 
to Schor, 35 BUFF. L. REV. 854 (1986). 
153 See infra notes 182-206 and accompanying text. 
154Id. 
155 See infra note 267 and accompanying text. 
156 See e.g., Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 (18 How.) 272 
(1855); Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 235 (1845). 
157 See infra notes 158-74 and accompanying text. 
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this principle as early as 1845 in Cary v. Curtis.158 In Cary, the 
Court considered a statute providing that the Secretary of the 
Treasury hear and decide all initial challenges to assessed and 
paid customs duties. 159 The plaintiff in Cary claimed that the 
legislative scheme was unconstitutional in that it denied citizens 
access to federal courts. 160 Though the Court did not address the 
issue of a citizen's right of access to federal courts, it did consider 
Congress' power to provide for adjudication in a non-article III 
forum. The Court found that the government's sovereign im-
munity allowed it to claim an exemption from suit in its own 
courts. 161 The Court further found that the government's greater 
power to prohibit challenges to its customs determinations al-
lowed it, if it did consent to suit, the lesser power to prescribe 
the type of trial. I62 This broad power apparently included pro-
viding for initial adjudication in a non-article III forum. 
The Court employed similar reasoning in Murray's Lessee v. 
Hoboken Land & Improvement Co. 163 In Murray's Lessee, the Court 
considered a statute empowering Treasury officials to seize and 
sell lands of customs collectors if an audit of the collector showed 
a balance due. 164 The appellant claimed that seizure and sale of 
a collector's land by a Treasury official was a judicial proceeding 
that could only be carried out under federal judicial power. 165 
The statute provided for judicial review of the Treasury official's 
decision. 166 The Court first noted that, although all administrative 
acts involving the application of law to facts are by their nature 
judicial acts,167 their status as judicial acts does not necessarily 
require that such acts be carried out under the judicial power. 168 
The Court then set out the parameters of its view of the judicial 
power, and introduced the public rights doctrine, stating: 
[w]e do not consider Congress can either withdraw from 
judicial cognizance any matter which, from its nature, is the 
158 Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 235. 
159 [d. at 241. 
160 [d. at 245. 
161 [d. 
162 [d. 
163 Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 
(1855). 
164 [d. at 274. 
165 [d. at 273. 
166 [d. at 281. 
167 [d. at 280. 
168/d. 
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subject of a suit at the common law, or in equity, or admiralty; 
nor, on the other hand, can it bring under the judicial power 
a matter which, from its nature, is not a subject for judicial 
determination. At the same time there are matters, involving 
public rights, which may be presented in such form that the 
judicial power is capable of acting on them, and which are 
susceptible of judicial determination, but which Congress 
mayor may not bring within the cognizance of the courts of 
the United States, as it may deem proper. 169 
257 
This passage establishes the general principle that there is a 
broadly defined category for which non-article III adjudication 
is constitutionally permissible .170 
The Court did not elaborate on the general contours of the 
realm of public rights. I7I Instead, the Court focused its inquiry 
on the nature of the Treasury official's act and on the govern-
ment's sovereign power to choose the forum in which it subjects 
itself to suit. Relying heavily on the strong historical practice of 
summary and non-judicial procedure in revenue collection, and 
on the pragmatic necessity of such procedure,172 the Court con-
cluded that such procedures were within Congress's power to 
make all laws necessary and proper for the exercise of its article 
I power to lay and collect duties.173 The Court also emphasized 
that statutory provision for judicial review did not conclusively 
demonstrate that the issue fell within the judicial power. Rather, 
as in Cary, the Court found that as sovereign, the federal govern-
ment could provide for judicial review of the summary proceed-
ings or deny review altogether. 174 
Cary and Murray's Lessee establish several important principles. 
Murray's Lessee lays the foundation for permissible non-article III 
adjudication: some matters must be within the judicial power, 
namely those which by their nature are common law claims, 
169 [d. at 284. 
170 First adopted by the Court as it established the traditional public rights doctrine, 
this statement is now relied on by the Court in its modern approach to nonarticle III 
adjudication. See Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Products Co., 473 U.S. 568, 583 (1984); 
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50 (1932). Thus, the origin of the Court's modern 
tolerance of non-article III adjudication may be traced to the traditional public rights 
doctrine. 
171 Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 281-
84. 
172 [d. at 281-82. 
173 [d. at 281, 283 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8). 
17. [d. at 282. 
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equitable claims, or admiralty claims. 175 Other matters may not 
be brought within a Court's cognizance, though the Court gives 
us no examples. 176 Between these extremes lie public rights, mat-
ters which Congress may choose to include in federal court juris-
diction or not. J77 Both Cary and Murray's Lessee also help define 
the core of the traditional universe of public rights, namely, where 
the federal government lifts its sovereign veil and consents to 
SUit. 178 Finally, both cases provide concrete factual situations in 
which non-article III adjudication is proper. In Cary, challenge 
of a customs collector's assessment could be initially adjudicated 
by the Secretary of the Treasury. 179 In Murray's Lessee, a summary 
proceeding used by the government to ensure payment of monies 
collected could be undertaken by a Treasury official,180 and pro-
vision for judicial review of the official's action was at the complete 
discretion of Congress. 181 This leads to the final and perhaps 
most important principle as applied to the FTA-that where there 
is a public right, the government may not only consent to initial 
adjudication outside of article III courts, but may provide for no 
article III review at all. 
3. The Modern Public Rights Doctrine 
Through its modern approach the Court has expanded the 
scope of permissible non-article III adjudication and review be-
yond disputes between the government and its citizens. 182 Specif-
ically, the Court has allowed non-article III adjudication of certain 
disputes between private parties arising out of claims based on a 
federal statute. In Crowell v. Benson,183 for example, the Court 
upheld an act providing for non-article III administrative deter-
mination of employer liability under a federal compensation 
act. 184 Under the act, factual determinations were not subject to 
175 See supra note 169 and accompanying text. 
176Id. 
177 Id. 
17S See supra notes 161-62, 174 and accompanying text. 
179 See supra note 159 and accompanying text. 
ISO See supra note 164 and accompanying text. 
lSI See supra note 174 and accompanying text. 
IS2 See infra notes 183-95 and accompanying text. See Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land 
& Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284. See also Northern Pipeline Co. v. 
Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50, 70 (1981). 
IS3 Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932). 
IS4 Id. at 36-39. 
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judicial review, but matters of law were reviewable by federal 
courts. 185 Similarly, in Thomas v. Union Carbide,186 the Court up-
held a federal statute mandating non-article III arbitration be-
tween private parties over compensation owed by one company 
for use of the other's registration data. 187 The arbitrator's decision 
was final, and subject to judicial review only for fraud, misrepre-
sentation, or other misconduct. 188 
The Court's modern approach has even expanded the scope 
of permissible non-article III adjudication beyond the factual 
situations of Crowell and Thomas, and has allowed non-article III 
adjudication of disputes between private parties arising from 
common law claims. In Commodities Futures Trading Commission v. 
Schor,189 for example, the Court considered the Commodities 
Exchange Act (Act)190 establishing the Commodities Futures 
Trading Commission (CFTC).191 The CFTC administered a rep-
arations procedure in which customers of professional commod-
ities brokers could seek redress for a broker's violation of the Act 
or CFTC regulations. 192 One regulation allowed the CFTC to 
adjudicate common law counterclaims that arose from a trans-
action or occurrence set forth in the complaint. 193 The legal rul-
ings of the CFTC were subject to de novo judicial review. 194 The 
Court held CFTC jurisdiction over common law counterclaims 
constitutionally permissible. 195 By allowing non-article III adju-
dication of disputes between private parties arising from state 
common law, the Court allowed non-article III adjudication of 
the type of claim a traditional public rights analysis would require 
to be brought before article III judges. 
In its expansion of the scope of permissible non-article III 
adjudication, the Court has necessarily abandoned its traditional 
public rights analysis. Where the traditional analysis would direct 
a court to inquire whether the government is a party to the 
185 [d. at 44, 46. 
186 Thomas v. Union Carbide, 473 U.S. 568 (1985). 
187 [d. at 571. See Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, & Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136a. 
188 Thomas, 473 U.S. at 573-74. 
189 Commodities Futures Trading Commission v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986). 
190 Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, & Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1-22, (1976). 
191 [d. §§ 35-36. 
192 Schor, 478 U.S. at 836. 
193 [d. at 837. 
194 [d. at 853. 
195 [d. at 851-52. 
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dispute, and whether the claim arises from common law, equity, 
or admiralty, the modern approach directs a court to consider a 
number of factors in light of the practical effect of the legislative 
scheme on the constitutional integrity of the judiciary. 196 In the 
modern cases, the Court progressively developed its analysis of 
non-article III adjudication, and articulated its latest analytical 
structure most recently in Schor. In Schor, Justice O'Connor iden-
tifies several concerns to be considered in the determination of 
permissible non-article III adjudication. The factors are: 
... the extent to which the 'essential attributes of judicial 
power' are reserved to Article III courts, and, conversely, the 
extent to which the non-Article III forum exercises the range 
of jurisdiction and powers normally vested only in Article III 
courts, the origins and importance of the right to be adju-
dicated, and the concerns that drove Congress to depart from 
the requirements of Article 111. 197 
O'Connor's discussion of these concerns in Schor gives these 
considerations substance. Examining the legislative structure in 
light of these concerns, O'Connor finds that CFTC jurisdiction 
over common law counterclaims does not significantly disrupt the 
constitutional allocation of judicial power. 19B Because CFTC ju-
risdiction extends over a narrow and particular area of law, the 
congressional scheme does not threaten the "essential attributes 
of judicial Power .... "199 Similarly, the availability of de novo 
article III court review of legal determinations20o leads O'Connor 
to find that the legislative scheme does not not seriously under-
mine the federal judiciary.201 
As to the origin of the claim, O'Connor admits that the coun-
terclaim asserted is a private right arising from a state law, and 
therefore is within the "core" of matters normally reserved to an 
article III court. 202 She continues, however, that "there is no 
reason inherent in separation of powers principles to accord the 
state law character of a claim talismanic power in article III 
inquiries." Rather, the nature of such a claim only demands a 
searching examination of the congressional attempt to control 
196Id. 
197Id. at 851. 
198 Schor, 478 U.S. at 851-57. 
199Id. 
,00Id. at 852 . 
• 01 Id. at 853 . 
• 0. Id. 
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the manner in which the rights are adjudicated.203 Focusing on 
the substance of the scheme and not the form, O'Connor finds 
that "limited CFTC jurisdiction over a narrow class of common 
law claims as an incident to the CFTC's primary, unchallenged, 
adjudicative function does not create a substantial threat to the 
separation of powers."204 
Lastly, O'Connor examines the congressional purpose behind 
the scheme, and finds that Congress did not intend to undermine 
the federal judiciary, but instead intended to ensure the effec-
tiveness of the Commodities Exchange Act.205 The legitimate ex-
ercise of Congress's article I powers was sufficient to satisfy 
O'Connor's inquiry. Thus, three findings led the Court to hold 
that CFTC counterclaim jurisdiction did not violate article III: 
1) CFTC jurisdiction over common law claims was narrow; 2) the 
legislative scheme afforded de novo judicial review; and 3) the 
congressional purpose behind the scheme was not to undermine 
the judiciary.206 
Schor leaves behind three distinct areas of inquiry in the deter-
mination of permissible non-article III adjudication. As discussed, 
none of the concerns are determinative. As applied, the Schor 
balancing test allows non-article III disposal of claims between 
private parties even arising under state law, claims which are 
admitted by the Court to have characteristics of traditionally con-
ceived private rights. 
4. Summary of the Court's Traditional and Modern Analyses 
of Non-Article III Adjudication 
Judicial doctrine allowing adjudication in non-article III bodies 
can be split into two major eras on the basis of the type of analysis 
used. The first era, consisting of Cary and Murray's Lessee, estab-
lishes the traditional public rights doctrine.207 The traditional 
doctrine allows exceptions to article III adjudication when the 
government consents to suit and chooses the forum in which it 
may be challenged.208 
203 Schor, 478 U.S. at 854. 
204 [d. 
205 [d. at 856. 
206 See supra notes 197-205 and accompanying text. 
207 See supra notes 156-81 and accompanying text. 
208 [d. 
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The traditional doctrine does not distinguish between the 
power to hold initial adjudication in a non-article III forum, the 
power to provide for appellate review in a non-article III forum, 
or the prerogative to provide for no adjudication or review at 
all. 209 Rather, the doctrine is absolute, and the federal govern-
ment may, as sovereign, prescribe the manner and mode of ac-
tions in which it is involved.210 
Crowell, Thomas, and Schor compose the modern era. In its 
development of the modern doctrine, however, the Court has 
expanded the universe of permissible non-article III adjudication 
beyond claims between the government and its citizens to include 
disputes between private parties arising out of federal and com-
mon law claims,211 the matters Cary and Murray's Lessee require to 
be brought before article III judges. In doing so, the Court 
changed the focus of its analysis. Instead of inquiring whether 
rights are "public" or "private," the Court considers various iden-
tified interests.212 
It is important to note that the Court's consideration of these 
interests has only occurred in cases involving rights which would 
be considered private under a traditional public rights analysis. 213 
Thus, the Court has created a new analytical structure which 
accommodates its expansion of the types of adjudication which 
can take place outside of article III courts. In this light, it is not 
clear that all the concerns of the modern analysis apply to situa-
tions involving traditional public rights like those in Cary and 
Murray's Lessee.214 That the modern doctrine finds its origins in 
the public rights doctrine's initial departure from article III 
requirements215 indicates that the traditional doctrine might still 
have vitality. Arguably, rights which fall within the traditional 
public rights doctrine need not be affected by the new analysis. 
By adopting a new analysis, the Court has only facilitated the 
expansion of the scope of permissible non-article III adjudica-
tion,216 and has not necessarily placed new restrictions on non-
209/d. 
210 Id. 
211 See supra notes 182-206 and accompanying text. 
212 See supra note 197 and accompanying text. 
213 See Commodities Futures Trading Commission v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986); 
Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Products Co., 473 U.S. 568, 583 (1984); Crowell v. 
Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932). See also notes 182-95 and accompanying text. 
214 See supra notes 156-81 and accompanying text. 
215 See supra note 170 and accompanying text. 
216 See supra notes 182-206 and accompanying text. 
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article III adjudication of rights traditionally considered public. 
As section VI of this Note illustrates, the public nature of AD 
and CVD rights allows binational panel review under both the 
traditional and modern analyses. 
VI. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE BINATIONAL PANEL: ANALYSIS 
UNDER THE TRADITIONAL PUBLIC RIGHTS DOCTRINE AND THE 
COURT's MODERN ApPROACH TO NON-ARTICLE III ADJUDICATION 
A. Analysis Under the Traditional Public Rights Doctrine 
Under a traditional public rights analysis, the right to relief 
from either dumped or subsidized imports appears to be a public 
right, and susceptible to non-article III adjudication and review. 
One author has argued that as customs matters, AD and CVD 
actions have historic roots in common law actions of assumpsit, 
trover, and replevin, and therefore require article III review.217 
Though rights arising under AD and CVD laws are customs 
matters, it does not follow that their roots lie in the common law. 
Rather, federal statutes created the rights to relief from foreign 
dumping and subsidization. 218 Current federal law creates a 
mechanism to petition the government for relief from certain 
kinds of foreign trading competition.219 Congress has in effect 
created a procedure by which it bestows benefits on injured U.S. 
industries or producers.22o Distribution of these benefits is con-
ditioned on determination that dumping or subsidies exist as 
Congress defines those terms.221 The right to this type of govern-
mentally distributed relief does not appear to be the type of right 
which is at the core of judicial power, such as rights arising from 
common law, equity, or admiralty. Rather, it seems similar to the 
217 Customs and International Trade Bar Ass'n., Statement in Opposition to Withdrawal 
of Jurisdiction in the United States Court of International Trade and its Applicable 
Tribunals to Review Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Determinations of Federal 
Agencies Involving Canadian Merchandise. Adopted by the Board of Directors, Customs 
and International Trade Bar Association, Dec. 3, 1987 (discussed in Christenson and 
Gambrel, supra note 10, at 414). 
218 See H.R. REP. No. 816, supra note 75, at 10-11 n. 68 (1988). Senate Judiciary 
Committee Hearings, supra note 114, at _ (Prepared statement by Harold H. Bruff, John 
S. Reditt Professor of Law, University of Texas at Austin) [hereinafter Prepared Statement 
of Harold H. Bruff]. See, e.g., Tariff Act of 1930, supra note 102, 19 U.S.c. §§ 1671, 
1673. 
219 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671, 1673 
220 See supra notes 102-17 and accompanying text. 
221 [d. 
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type of right that traditionally would be considered a public right, 
a right that owes its existence to the sovereign government, and 
that may be vindicated in the manner and forum that the gov-
ernment prescribes. 222 
Moreover, despite any common law origin of the area of cus-
toms law generally, the Court has held consistently that rights in 
customs matters are public rights, and that as such, they are 
susceptible to adjudication in non-article III courts. The Congres-
sional scheme in Cary, for instance, provided for adjudication of 
customs assessments by the Secretary of the Treasury.223 The Cary 
Court considered non-article III customs adjudication to be 
within the government's competence, reviewable in the manner 
the government chose, and only if the government chose to pro-
vide for review at all. 224 Thus, the matter was exclusively within 
the prerogative of the government as sovereign. 
Antidumping and countervailing duties are similar to ordinary 
customs matters at issue in Cary, for both entail levying duties on 
imports. Indeed, the major difference seems to be procedural. 225 
In the case of ordinary tariffs, Congress predetermines their size. 
In the case of AD and CVD actions, agencies commence individ-
ual investigations into the presence and degree of dumping and 
subsidization.226 Rather than incorporate penalties for dumping 
and subsidization into its ordinary tariff structure, Congress has 
chosen to develop a more sensitive process to detect the extent 
of unfair trade practices on a case-by-case basis. In the end, it 
seems clear that Congress exercises the same power in each case, 
the power to regulate foreign commerce, which results in duties 
on imported goods. In this light, Cary suggests that rights under 
antidumping and countervailing duty laws, like rights associated 
with tariff collection, belong in the sphere of rights which Con-
gress may distribute on its own terms. 
Further Supreme Court discussion of the nature of rights un-
der trade laws also supports this conclusion. In Ex parte Bakelight 
222 See supra notes 156-81 and accompanying text. 
223 See supra notes 159 and accompanying text. 
224 See supra notes 161-62 and accompanying text. 
225 Prepared Statement of Harold H. Bruff, supra note 218. Antidumping and coun-
tervailing duties also differ from tariffs in that they each address a specific economic 
harm. In contrast, tariffs are set in response to a variety of economic and political 
pressures. See generally I.M. DESTLER, AMERICAN TRADE POLITICS: SYSTEM UNDER STRESS 
(1986). 
226 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671, 1673. 
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Corp.,227 the Court considered whether Congress established the 
Court of Customs Appeals pursuant to article III. In its opinion, 
the Court discussed the nature of the claims which came before 
the Court of Customs Appeals, "matters arising between the gov-
ernment and others in the executive administration and appli-
cation of customs laws."228 The Court stated that "[t]he appeals 
include nothing which inherently or necessarily requires judicial 
determination, but only matters the determination of which may 
be, and at times have been, committed exclusively to executive 
officers."229 It is no coincidence that this language sounds much 
like the first pronouncement of the public rights doctrine in 
Murray's Lessee-Bakelight cites Murray's Lessee for this proposi-
tion.230 Moreover, Bakelight invokes Cary for the proposition that 
the area of customs law falls within the category of matters which 
require no judicial involvement. 231 
In light of Cary, Bakelight, and the nature of rights under AD 
and CVD laws, it appears that such rights are of the type granted 
by the political branches of government, and that are to be vin-
dicated in the manner the government chooses. Congress has at 
times left the adjudication of such rights completely to non-article 
III bodies with no provision for article III review.232 The plenary 
and exclusive power over the manner of trial for the vindication 
of rights arising under trade laws historically has been exercised 
by Congress and recognized by the Court. Under a traditional 
public rights analysis, AD and CVD determinations seem to re-
quire no article III court participation, and binational panel re-
VIew of agency determinations appears compatible with article 
III. 
B. Analysis under the Modern Doctrine 
As discussed, however, the Court has developed a new ap-
proach to analysis of non-article III adjudication and review. The 
Court probably would employ its modern doctrine to any current 
challenge to non-article III adjudication. Certainly the Court has 
expressed no contrary indication. Analysis of the FTA legislative 
227 Ex Parte Bakelight Corp., 279 u.s. 438 (1929). 
228 [d. at 458. 
229 [d. 
230 [d. 
231 !d. 
232 !d. 
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scheme by the Schor criteria, however, demonstrates that bina-
tional panel review of AD and CVD determinations is not con-
strained by article III under the modern doctrine either. 
The Schor balancing test presents a modern framework for 
analysis of article III limits on adjudication of antidumping and 
countervailing duty actions by non-article III bodies. The Schor 
approach is not to focus on the identity of the parties to the 
dispute, but on the Congressional purpose behind the scheme, 
the origin and nature of the right asserted, and the intrusion into 
the prerogatives of article III courts.233 
l. Congressional Purpose Behind Non-Article III Adjudica-
tion and Review 
One of the Schor considerations is the concern that drove Con-
gress to utilize a forum other than the article III judiciary.234 In 
Schor, Congress's effort to make a regulatory scheme effective 
satisfied the Court that the congressional purpose was legiti-
mate. 235 As Professor Brown points out, this test is easily satisfied, 
for "Congress can seemingly always justify its use of non-article 
III tribunals by showing some programmatic need."236 
Congress' legitimate purpose in providing for review of AD 
and CVD determinations by the binational panel is easily dem-
onstrated. The purpose behind the creation of the panel is to 
reduce economic and diplomatic tensions between the United 
States and Canada arising from adjudication of trade disputes. 237 
Toward this end, the panel represents an interim measure in the 
continuing negotiations to find appropriate dumping and subsidy 
standards for the free trade area.238 Notably, the binational panel 
alleviates a central concern of Canadian traders, making the 
Agreement as a whole more appealing to the Canadian electo-
rate. 239 The binational panel also provides significant benefits to 
American traders who can now seek review of previously unrev-
iewable Canadian antidumping and countervailing duty deter-
233 See supra note 197 and accompanying text. 
234Id. 
235 See supra notes 205-06 and accompanying text. 
236 Brown, supra note 134, at 74. 
237 See H.R. REP. No. 816, supra note 10, at 3. 
238Id. 
239 See supra notes 76-87 and accompanying text. 
1990] FREE-TRADE AGREEMENT 267 
minations.24o Thus, Congress's purpose in providing for initial 
non-article III adjudication and binational panel review is de-
monstrably legitimate. 
2. The Nature of the Claim and Consequent Threats to Sep-
aration of Powers 
The second Schor consideration demands inquiry into the ori-
gins and importance of the right to be adjudicated,241 or into, as 
alternatively phrased, the nature of the claim.242 In Schor, O'Con-
nor makes clear that inquiry into the nature of the 'claim is not 
to derive a label which then mechanically determines the type of 
adjudication required.243 Rather, the purpose of examining the 
nature of that claim before a non-article III court is to determine 
whether there is a substantial threat to the separation of pow-
ers.244 Of particular concern is the adjudication of claims arising 
from common law, equity, and admiralty, which are presumed to 
be at the core of the federal judicial function. 245 In Schor, the 
Court found narrow CFTC jurisdiction over state common law 
claims merely incidental to the regulatory scheme.246 The Court's 
search for actual, tangible, and substantial aggrandizement of 
power by Congress at the expense of the judiciary found no threat 
to the separation of powers.247 
Initial adjudication and subsequent review by non-article III 
bodies threatens neither the integrity of the judicial branch nor 
separation of powers. Previous conclusions about the nature of 
rights arising under AD and CVD laws bears this OUt.248 AD and 
CVD rights arise from federal statute, and have no distinct origin 
in the common law.249 Further, rights under AD and CVD laws 
appear similar to rights under other customs laws, rights which 
the Court has found susceptible of non-article III adjudication.250 
AD and CVD rights seem to be matters which are "susceptible of 
240 See H.R. REP. No. 816, supra note 10, at 3. 
241 See supra note 197 and accompanying text. 
242 Brown, supra note 134, at 73. 
243 Commodities Futures Trading Commission v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 853-54 (1986). 
244 /d. 
245 Id. 
246Id. at 954. 
247Id. 
248 See supra notes 218-32 and accompanying text. 
249 See supra notes 218-19 and accompanying text. 
250 See supra notes 218-32 and accompanying text. 
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judicial determination, but which Congress mayor may not bring 
within the cognizance of the courts of the United States, as it may 
deem proper."251 In this light, non-article III adjudication and 
review of AD and CVD actions does not appear to threaten the 
integrity of the judicial branch, and the danger posed to the 
separation of powers seems minimal. 
3. Encroachment on Essential Attributes of Judicial Power 
The last Schor inquiry is the extent to which the essential attri-
butes of judicial power are reserved to article III courts.252 The 
only part of the congressional scheme in Schor that posed a threat 
to the essential attributes of the judicial function was CFTC ju-
risdiction over the state law counterclaim.253 The Court, however, 
found that provision for de novo review of all legal determina-
tions by an article III court left enough of the judicial power 
undisturbed to satisfy any concerns. 254 
Under the FT A legislative scheme, it appears that the only 
attribute of judicial power left to article III courts is the power 
to review constitutional claims,255 for both initial adjudication and 
appellate review take place in non-article III bodies.256 This 
should not frustrate the congressional scheme for several reasons. 
First, as discussed,257 it is difficult to assert that either initial 
adjudication or appellate review of AD or CVD actions is an 
essential judicial function. The provision of remedies for unfair 
trade practices seems to be the prerogative of the political 
branches of the federal government.258 Congressional practice 
and judicial decision indicate that this is the case. 259 Even though 
article III courts only enjoy jurisdiction over constitutional issues, 
they miss no essential judicial attributes with respect to enforce-
ment of trade laws. Conversely, the powers exercised by the ITA, 
the lTC, and a binational panel, though similar to those exercised 
by a court, are not those normally vested exclusively in article III 
251 Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land and Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 
284 (1855). 
252 Commodities Futures Trading Co. v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 85 (1986). 
253 Id. at 852. 
254Id. at 853. 
255 See supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text. 
256Id. 
257 See supra notes 241-51 and accompanying text. 
258 See supra notes 218-32 and accompanying text. 
259Id. 
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courts.260 Rather, they exercise powers which Congress has vested 
in a variety of article III and non-article III bodies.261 
Still, the presence of article III review, in one form or another, 
has been essential to validation of non-article III adjudication in 
the modern doctrine of Crowell, Thomas, and Schor.262 In Crowell, 
the Court found that judicial review of matters of law satisfied 
requirements of judicial involvement in that type of case.263 In 
Thomas, the Court found that judicial review of fraud, miscon-
duct, and misrepresentation, "preserves the 'appropriate exercise 
of the judicial function."'264 In Schor, the Court found that avail-
ability of de novo review by an article III court265 helped preserve 
the integrity of the federal judiciary.266 Several commentators 
suggest that not only does article III review satisfy the Courts' 
concern over the usurpation of essential article III functions, but 
article III review has become a necessity for valid non-article III 
adjudication.267 Several considerations caution against accepting 
article III review as a requirement for non-article III adjudica-
tion. 
First, the requirement of article III court review as a necessary 
component of permissible non-article III court adjudication has 
not evolved into a well-defined principle. In Thomas, Justice 
O'Connor stated that the degree of review required depends on 
the origin of the right and the congressional purpose of the 
statutory scheme.268 Exactly how much review satisfies article III 
requirements is not entirely clear. In Crowell, review of matters 
of law was enough.269 In Thomas, review of an arbitrator's fraud 
and misconduct was sufficient.270 In Schor, de novo review allayed 
26°Id. 
261 See Senate Hearings (Prepared Statement by Andreas F. Lowenfeld), supra note 114. 
Telephone interview with Jeanne Anderson, Former Deputy General Counsel, Interna-
tional Trade Commission (Feb. 13, 1989). 
262 See supra notes 182-206 and accompanying text. 
263 Id. 
264 Id. at 592 (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 54 (1932». 
265 See supra note 200 and accompanying text. 
266 See supra note 201 and accompanying text. 
267 Professor Fallon contends article III court review could be required by article III. 
See Fallon, Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article III, 101 HARV. L. REv. 
916, 918 (1988). Professor Brown suggests that the recent public rights cases imply that 
article III review is already a constitutional requirement. See Brown, supra note 134, at 
86. 
268 Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Products Co., 473 U.S. 568, 587 (1985). 
269 Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22,49 (1932). 
270 Thomas, 473 U.S. at 592. 
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the Court's concern over encroachment on the judiciary.271 Thus, 
under Crowell and Thomas, claims arising under federal statute 
may not require full article III court review. Under Schor, how-
ever, claims arising from common law seem to require de novo 
article III review. But the Court's recent decisions have not con-
sidered the degree of article III review required for the situation 
presented by the FTA and its implementing legislation, that is, a 
legislative scheme that requires no article III court involvement 
under a traditional public rights analysis. Indeed, nothing in the 
modern analysis suggests that article III court review is now a 
necessary component of all initial non-article III adjudication. 
In essence, the Court's emphasis on article III review only arises 
in cases where it allows non-article III adjudication of rights 
inherently more private than public. 272 As the Court expanded 
the scope of permissible non-article III adjudication beyond the 
traditional public rights core of Cary and Murray's Lessee, and thus 
further away from the Framers' clear intent that only indepen-
dent judges exercise the federal judicial power, article III court 
review seems to have helped save legislative schemes the Court 
found otherwise troublesome. Thus, any requirement of article 
III review does not seem relevant to situations involving non-
article III adjudication of rights traditionally considered public. 
Rather, it seems limited to situations where traditionally conceived 
private rights are adjudicated in non-article III courts. Because 
antidumping and countervailing duty laws appear to confer rights 
that truly appear public under a traditional analysis, even the 
Court's modern approach to non-article III adjudication seems 
to require no article III review. 
4. Summary of Analysis Under the Modern Doctrine 
Analysis of the FTA legislative scheme under the Schor consid-
erations demonstrates that the modern doctrine places no limits 
on binational panel review of antidumping and countervailing 
duty determinations by the ITA and the ITC.273 First, Congress 
has a demonstrably legitimate purpose in establishing the legis-
lative scheme.274 Second, the public nature of the claims shows 
271 Commodities Futures Trading Commission v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986). 
272 See supra notes 211-16 and accompanying text. 
273 See supra notes 218-72 and accompanying text. 
274 See supra notes 234-40 and accompanying text. 
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that adjudication outside article III courts poses no threat to the 
separation of powers.275 Finally, as public rights, AD and CVD 
claims require no article III court participation in their adjudi-
cation, and no essential attributes of the judicial function are 
spirited from the federal courts. 276 
It should be emphazized that the Court's modern analysis does 
not require article III court review of claims similar to those 
traditionally conceived as core public rights. 277 Any requirement 
for article III review developed through cases involving non-
article III adjudication of rights that are clearly within the judicial 
power. These cases do not suggest that article III review is now 
a requisite component of a legislative scheme allowing non-article 
III adjudication of rights traditionally considered public. The 
Court has not indicated that its expansion of permissible non-
article III adjudication imposes new article III requirements on 
rights traditionally considered public. 
5. Reflections on the Analysis of Public Rights Under the 
Modern Doctrine . 
In its articulation of the Schor considerations, the Court ex-
plicitly abandoned the traditional public rights analysis, and fo-
cused instead on the substance of the right underlying the claim 
to be adjudicated. Analysis of antidumping and countervailing 
duty law illustrates, however, that inquiry into the "nature of the 
claim" and the "essential attributes of judicial power" uncovers 
substance identical to the core of any public right. Apparently, 
rights satisfying the traditional public rights analysis easily satisfy 
these two Schor considerations. In this light it would appear dif-
ficult for the Court to exclude a right that satisfies the traditional 
public rights analysis from non-article III adjudication. Instead, 
it seems that in the absence of an illegitimate legislative purpose, 
the Court may rely on non-article III adjudication of such rights 
as established instances of permissible deviation from the explicit 
constitutional requirement that the independent federal judiciary 
exercise the federal judicial power. 
275 See supra notes 241-51 and accompanying text. 
276 See supra notes 252-72 and accompanying text. 
277 See supra notes 262-72 and accompanying text. 
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CONCLUSION 
Exclusive binational panel review of antidumping and counter-
vailing duty determinations is compatible with the Court's mod-
ern tolerance of non-article III adjudication. Congress's power 
to limit federal court jurisdiction is well established by judicial 
doctrine and congressional practice. Congress's power to provide 
for non-article III adjudication of certain types of claims is con-
sistently recognized by the Court. Though certain claims may 
demand more article III court participation than others, the or-
igin and nature of rights under AD and CVD laws demonstrate 
that, whether considered under the traditional public rights doc-
trine or the modern Schor analysis, they require no article III 
court participation at all. 
If other constitutional concerns raised by the binational panel 
are resolved favorably, then the panel will serve effectively as a 
cornerstone of the Agreement. Binational panel review should 
function as an important mechanism for alleviating significant 
trading problems between the United States and Canada.278 Ne-
gotiations ought to continue smoothly over appropriate AD and 
CVD standards to govern the free trade area. 279 Moreover, bin-
ational panel review will enhance the continuing political accept-
ability of the Agreement as the two nations adjust to greater 
integration in trade, services, finance, and national resources. 280 
If the United States finds it desirable to enter into other similar 
arrangements, then the binational panel may serve as a successful 
model. 
278 [d. 
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